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The scholar is not The Intellectual. He is Man Thinking. Man Thinking
is not the member of a race apart. He is the citizen performing the function
appointed for all citizens in a civilized state, a function without which there
would be no civilized state. He is Everyman purposefully apprehending the
meaning of things .... Between the true scholar and the teacher there is no
fundamental incompatibility but a fundamental affinity of the most intimate
kind.
-A. Whitney Griswold'
Quod licit jovi, non licit bovi. What is permitted of Jupiter is not
permitted of cows. I do not know Latin, but I do know this phrase. I learned it
from Michael Reisman. It stuck with me because it captures the authority of
the president in the area of national security. While serving as the Legal
Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC), I found it useful in
explaining to NSC staff why the president could accept gifts, but they could
not. He was Jupiter and they were cows.
Today, the phrase offers a point of departure for considering Michael's
contribution to the field of national security law. Although I am hesitant to
suggest that Michael's academic colleagues are somehow cows (they are not),
I have no hesitation in calling Michael Jupiter. That is because Michael's
contributions stand apart.
There is, of course, his scholarship: twenty-two books, three hundred
articles, and counting. This work is comprehensive, realistic, and it bridges the
gap between law and legal policy because it describes where we should go,
not just where we are, or have been. For that reason, it is useful to the national
security practitioner.
Michael has also prepared countless students for careers in public
service-in government and academia. He has done so directly in the
classroom and in countless letters of recommendation. He has also done so
indirectly by offering a distinct and distinctive voice at Yale on matters of
international law, constitutional law, and jurisprudence.
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Michael is Jupiter because he is a Scholar-Teacher, not one or the other,
but both as one-representing "a fundamental affinity of the most intimate
kind."2 In this role, this most uncommon writer, intellect, and tutor is what
Griswold called the "Everyman purposefully apprehending the meaning of
things."3 What is more, Michael exemplifies many of the traits most useful to
the practice of national security law. No wonder that through his scholarship,
teaching, and example, Michael has informed, tested, and inspired generations
of lawyers.
I appreciate that now. However, I will admit that I did not feel so
inspired the first time I talked with Michael. He did not seem like Griswold's
Everyman. And I felt like a cow.
The knock on the door was followed by, "Come!" Lunch ensued in the
faculty lounge. Michael had just invited me to co-write a paper on covert
action based on a single comment I made in class. We continued "the
discussion" at lunch, which meant that Michael and Myres McDougal
continued the discussion. I grazed. I didn't understand a word they said. Were
they speaking Latin? No. It was a legal dialect I came to refer to as
"Ladougalman"-a form of perfect prose derived from the scholarship of
Professors Lasswell, McDougal, and Reisman, laced with phrases like
"constitutive process," "human dignity," "modalities," and "minimum and
optimum world public order."
What had I gotten myself into? After lunch, I called on Professor Eli
Clark, whose reputation as the warm and kind undergraduate Master of
Silliman College also characterized his open-door policy at the law school. I
sat below the map Eli used as a pilot during "Operation Market Garden," the
Allies' bold, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to drop airborne troops to
seize the lowland bridgeheads to the Rhine. Then, I reported my predicament.
Did he have a dictionary that would define the foreign phrases I heard at
lunch? He did not. I would have to devise my own. But he did have words of
encouragement and told me to jump at the invitation.
When I hit the ground, I found friendship, rigor, and an Everyman
scholar dedicated to the study of force, minimization of suffering, and the
advancement of human dignity and the law.
Constitutional government is not on autopilot. It is a constant and
incremental grind that depends on the moral integrity of the lawyers who
wield the Constitution's power and promise. This is especially true in the area
of national security where much remains unseen and beyond external
validation.
2. ALFRED WHITNEY GRISWOLD, IN THE UNIVERSITY TRADITION 112 (1957).
3. Id.
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[E]xperience has obscured the fact that, no matter how carefully defined and
administered, no government of laws is insensible to what Plato termed "the endless
irregular movements of human things." Laws are made by men, interpreted by men, and
enforced by men, and in the continuous process, which we call government, there is
continuous opportunity for the human will to assert itself.
4
Michael's work reflects this understanding. It stands apart in its willingness to
address the three dimensions of national security law: the substance of the
law; the process of decision; and the nature of legal practice, including the
role that personality plays, or what he might call "human agency." Indeed,
without understanding process and practice, substance can become an
abstraction. Without understanding process, the lawyer cannot meaningfully
apply the law because he won't be in the room to provide advice to the
decisionmaker. He will also be excluded from the decisionmaking forum if he
does not understand how to apply law to policy in a realistic, but value-based
manner.
Michael's analysis is realistic. He analyzes the law as it is (or is not, as
the case may be), not as he or others might wish it to be. Hence, Michael
distinguishes between what he refers to as the operational code and the
aspirational or normative myth system. "By operational code is meant a set of
norms that operate in a certain sector and that actors deem to be authoritative
even though the norms may be inconsistent with formal legal codes.",5 Thus,
the operational code recognizes that all states are not equal in defining
international law, and on some matters, elites matter more than other persons.
Quid licitjovi, non licit bovi. This is not a cynical view, nor a matter of Pax
Americana; it is descriptive.
It is the operational code that informs policymaking. Thus, Michael's
scholarship is immediately relevant to practitioners, that is to say, the
President, national security principals, congressional leadership, and the
lawyers who advise them. If you believe, as I do, that the law should regulate
decisionmaking and can guide actors toward informed and wise choices, then
these individuals are your most important audience. And decisionmakers need
to know what the law is at the outset, without policy spin or preferential lean,
just as they need to know what the intelligence is, without spin or lean. That
does not mean lawyers should limit themselves to "yes," "no," or "I don't
know," any more than intelligence analysts should eschew predictions or best
judgments. It means they should indicate what is hard law, what is nuanced or
debatable law, and what is legal policy directed toward preferred outcomes.
Michael's work is policy-based because it is value-based. Michael is
realistic without losing sight of the law's ideal and the overriding objectives of
human dignity and optimum public order. This interjection of values is
accomplished not by pretending the law is something it is not, but by
articulating what it should become by identifying preferred outcomes,
showing decisionmakers how to achieve those outcomes, and demonstrating
why those values improve our physical security and advance our liberty
interests.
4. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, at 161.
5. W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 777, 777 n.3 (1989).
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[lI]t is not sufficient for the scholar simply to identify and assemble trends in decision.
Trends must then be tested against the requirements of world public order as a means of
assessing their adequacy. Insofar as they are found wanting, scholars should take the
responsibility of proposing alternative arrangements so that a better approximation of
political and legal goals can be achieved in the future.6
In short, the difference between the operational code and preferred
outcomes is the difference in practice between telling the decisionmaker what
the law is, and advising the decisionmaker on the pros and cons of choosing
one legally available option over another and how best to shape the law. The
latter is legal policy. Put more bluntly, Michael is not on an academic hamster
wheel. He aims to close the gap between the academic and the practical. He
writes to inform, to guide, and to change, so that the law might better preserve
public order and advance human dignity.
Michael's work is also distinctive because it identifies and incorporates
the critical influence that process (good, bad, or absent) plays in legal and
policy decisionmaking. Indeed, process and practice are often more important
than substance, particularly if the decisionmaking process is colored by the
pathologies of secrecy, speed, and immediacy, as is often the case in national
security practice.
This understanding of process is reflected in the seven functions of
decisionmaking: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application,
termination, and appraisal.7 While the terminology is dense, the analysis is
precise, with substantial emphasis on the first and last criteria.
Decisionmakers learn at their peril that mastery of the intelligence instrument
is integral to their roles. This understanding is crucial where the use of force is
contemplated and the distinction between evidence and actionable intelligence
is critical.
If the United States is sometimes found wanting in the area of long-
range intelligence, it is even more wanting in the area of effective appraisal. In
theory, and sometimes in practice, this happens during the process of
decision-at Principals and Deputies meetings. But the focus tends toward the
immediate and not the enduring consequences of policy choice. Moreover,
rarely is there an effective process of ongoing appraisal-intemal or
external-to ensure that decisions are implemented as intended and that one
problem solved does not mutate into a new problem requiring policy
adjustment.
Michael also appreciates the sometimes dominant role of informal rather
than formal processes of decisionmaking, as well as the role personality has in
shaping decisions, whether those decisions are made at NSC meetings or
faculty meetings. This is an operational code of a different sort. Lawyers, and
certainly law schools, tend to focus on the formal-the textual conveyance of
law or process. Michael looks behind the curtain to determine how and where
decisions in fact are made, and by whom. This awareness of human influence
6. W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3,
6 (1999).
7. Michael Reisman, 1995 Seibenthaler Lecture, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the
"Political Superior, " 23 N. KY. L. REV. 605, 612 (1996).
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does not reflect the scholar apart. This is the scholar as part of the human
condition-Everyman contributing to the meaning of things.
Whether or not you agree with his voice, students who are exposed to it
"often spen[d] the rest of their lives under the influence of his ideas or
contending with them," which is how Michael himself described Professor
McDougal. 8 First, that means contending with the notion that the Constitution
is designed to uphold and defend our physical security and our liberty
interests-not one or the other, but both. The liberty interest entails the
preservation of our constitutional values, including those values based on due
process and tolerance, but also the notion of physical defense, found in the
Preamble to the Constitution and enumerated Articles that follow. Security
means not only physical safety, but also the sense of secure space that allows
us to carry on a way of life that is diverse and tolerant. Second, one must also
contend with Michael's view that international law is not the aspirational
refuge of the complex, elite, or weak. Shaped well and wielded wisely,
international law is an instrument that advances our physical security and
upholds our legal values.
9
But these observations of Michael's work represent the tip of the
iceberg. The scholar who believes in law must also believe in the conditions
that foster the law. That entails the training of men and women not just in the
substance of the law, but in the process, practice, and values of law. In short,
the scholar must also serve as teacher. If Michael's scholarship has informed
generations of national security officials, his teaching has directly shaped
generations of national security lawyers. It is this contribution as the Scholar-
Teacher that runs deepest, but it is hidden in plain view, disguised by an
overwhelming written legacy and hidden beneath the waves in the practice of
others.
It turns out that Michael's attributes as the Scholar-Teacher include
many of the values necessary to meaningfully practice national security law.
In no area of law are these values more vital than in addressing questions
involving intelligence and the use of force. The pressure is greatest where
lives are at stake and the law most subject to malleable claims of authority. I
will describe a few of the traits I have in mind.
Rigor. The best skills training I ever received as a lawyer was as a
Marine Corps infantry officer. I got screamed at a lot, operated under
pressure, and was held accountable for the decisions I made, or should have
made. The best analytic training I ever received came from Michael Reisman.
The Reisman tutorial was my Legal Boot Camp. It was there that fledgling
arguments were broken down, tested, and rebuilt as I gained the intellectual
confidence to find my legal voice and then defend it.
When we were working on our book, the first chapter I submitted to
Michael was met with a single-word response: "No." This was succinct
feedback. It was also a bit "Marine" in character. But it came with something
more, which made all the difference. Michael also conveyed the confidence of
8. Richard A. Falk et al., Comment, Myres Smith McDougal (1906-1998), 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
729, 733 (1998).
9. James E. Baker, What s International Law Got To Do with It? Transnational Law and the
Intelligence Mission, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 639, 651-54 (2007).
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high expectations and the certainty that he knew I could do better. He asks for
rigor because he expects rigor, and in expecting rigor, he shows respect for his
students and his colleagues. This is the difference between the teacher who
assumes a student is up to the task, and the teacher who assumes that the
student is not.
Endurance. I was startled when I was asked to contribute to a
celebration of Michael's seventieth birthday. Naturally, I was happily
surprised that I was asked at all. I was also surprised because it never occurred
to me that Michael was seventy years old. He is ageless. His scholarship is
ageless. His engine is stuck in full steam ahead, and it always has been.
I once met someone who went to grade school and high school with
Michael. "Really?" I asked. It had not occurred to me that Michael entered
this world as something other than a professor. I had to ask, did he speak in
prose then as he does now? "Yes." Did he write book reports, or just books?
"Just books," was the answer. Ageless indeed!
Work ethic. John Kenneth Galbraith was renowned for the spontaneity of
his written voice. When asked the secret to this spontaneity, he responded:
five drafts.'
0
In contrast, Michael is known for speaking in publishable prose. In
1992, I attended a conference at the Naval War College on the use of force.
The audience was invited to comment after the primary presentation. Hands
shot up throughout the hall; Michael spoke first. Following his remarks, the
presenter again asked for comment; not a hand went up. Nobody wished to
follow Michael's publishable observations. Fortunately, with some coaxing,
the conversation continued.
But if Michael is a verbal printing press, he gains his insight the old-
fashioned way-through study, inquisition, and an open mind. James Russell
Lowell said that President Abraham Lincoln was a great lawyer because he
was able to see both sides of every argument.' 1 No one who has benefited
from Michael's presence at Yale will fail to see that, where international and
constitutional law are in play, there are at least two sides to every argument.
Here the iceberg metaphor remains apt. There is much hard work beneath the
waves of prose.
Humility. The first rule of intelligence is to know what you do not know.
Michael is a lifelong learner because he knows what he does not know. In
2001, I co-taught a course with Michael entitled "Managing National
Security." I was uncertain at the outset about the allocation of speaking roles.
At the first class, when it was clear that Michael did not intend to speak, I
began to talk about the subject of national security process. After one hour, I
was near the end of my "contingency" outline. During the break I asked,
"Aren't you going to say anything?" Michael responded: "Why would I? I am
learning too much." This exchange also reminds me of something else
Griswold said about teaching: "From the standpoint of the student .... if he's
10. Interview by Harry Kreisler, Inst. of Int'l Studies with John Kenneth Galbraith,
Intellectual Journey: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: The Art of Good Writing (Mar. 27, 1986),
available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Galbraith/galbraith2.html.
11. See James Russell Lowell, Abraham Lincoln, in ESSAYS ENGLISH AND AMERICAN 441,
455 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1910).
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at all curious intellectually... he's bound to learn more from the man who is
himself learning than he is from the man who just tells him about learning."
' 12
That is the scholar as teacher. On the train ride home, I prepared a detailed
outline for the remainder of the course.
Grace. Michael may be an intellectual drill instructor, but he instructs
with grace. He respects his students and his colleagues, even if he disagrees
with their arguments. Michael's answer to a bad idea is a better idea, not a
louder voice.
Moreover, Michael bears the moral authority of someone who "practices
what he teaches." In practice, Michael remains focused on the use of force,
humanitarian values, and the realization of minimum, if not optimum, public
order through law. He then, in turn, applies and teaches these concepts.
Consider, for example, his tireless efforts to bring the Eritrea-Ethiopia
boundary dispute to peaceful resolution and his work on the Inter-American
Commission. Michael honors the legal profession and the academy by acting
as well as professing to advance the interests in which he believes. This
informs his teaching and it inspires others to do the same.
Moral courage. Finally, Michael illustrates in the academic context what
it means to be Teddy Roosevelt's "Man in the Arena." 13 Michael is not a
fence-sitter and he does not play to the audience. He calls it as he sees it. And,
if you are on a fence, he will ask you off.
He makes predictions. He is wrong some of the time, but he is right most
of the time. Consider that Michael was writing about nonstate actors and
terrorism in the 1970s.14 And, in the 1990s, when the executive branch was
having trouble attracting congressional support to amend the law to better
counter terrorism, Michael was speaking about the looming threat.15 Michael
said the following in 1995 regarding the threat of terrorism:
Terrorism appears to be evolving into the preferred form of covert action of weaker states
and, to an extent that cannot yet be gauged, of groups that are not affiliated with any
state .... One way, if not the only way, to prevent terrorist incidents is by covert counter-
action. Are we witnessing the birth of a holy war against irregular terrorist forces about
the planet? If so, it is likely to be a "dirty" war unless the normative restraints that are
appropriate are carefully clarified and applied.1
6
For those with innate confidence, the Arena is a welcome mat. But for
those persons with innate modesty, the transition from student to advocate to
public official can be difficult. Nowhere will the scrutiny become more
glaring for the lawyer than where questions of force are involved. We should
hope so in a system of democratic accountability. But it is good to have a role
model like Michael when the kitchen gets hot.
12. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, at 197-98.
13. Theodore Roosevelt, The Man in the Arena: Citizenship in a Republic, Address at the
Sorbonne, Paris (Apr. 23, 1910), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT: LETTERS AND SPEECHES 778-98 (Louis
Auchincloss ed., 2004).
14. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to
Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
15. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Remarks, Covert Action, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 419, 423
(1995).
16. Id. at 424.
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Because Michael is always in search of preferred outcomes to better
serve human dignity and public order, he is often in that kitchen. That, in turn,
puts him in the Arena. And, like the man in Roosevelt's Arena, he takes his
shots. Consider Michael's article on the 1996 Qana incident in which he
suggested that states should assume compensatory responsibility for collateral
damage as a matter of humanitarian instinct and as a vehicle to reinforce
discrimination in targeting.' 7 The article was not embraced in government
circles. But the marketplace of ideas was better for contending with an idea
that had as its goal the minimization of suffering in warfare.
In short, he is not the critic, but Man Thinking, apprehending the
meaning of things and how the law might inform a more civilized society.
As Scholar-Teacher, Michael has brought credit to Yale and its law
school. He has honored Yale University's commitment to public service,
measured in the scholarship and deeds of teachers, judges, presidents, civil
servants, and the many lesser-known names on the walls of the Woolsey Hall
rotunda, whose commitment to service was greatest of all. Most of all, he has
used his remarkable intellect in the interest of a civilized society founded on
order, dignity, and law. In this regard, Michael is everyman, or at least
Griswold's Everyman. He is also Man Thinking, a scholar dedicated to
apprehending the meaning of things to advance our common interest in a
civilized state. And, for this, I thank him.
17. W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 381, 397-98 (1997).
